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SOM Theme B: Inter-Firm Coordination and Change
Abstract
This paper is concerned with the organization of transactions of goods
and services between consecutive stages of activity. An economic theory
of organization, transaction cost economics (TCE)|which proposes that
organizational form (e.g. market and hierarchy) is adjusted to the at-
tributes of transactions|is extended with the idea that the governance
of transactions should be analyzed within the wider network of the rms
they connect, and that agents' behavior is guided by adaptive learning
rather than by optimization.
An agent-based computer simulation model is developed and exper-
imented with, to study the patterns of governance that emerge from
interactions between agents making and breaking relations. In each of a
sequence of timesteps, a matching algorithm assigns buyers to suppliers
or to themselves, implementing their choices for market and hierarchy,
respectively. From each timestep to the next, the agents are allowed
to adapt their preferences for each other|that determine the outcome
of the matching|to their experiences. Patterns of economic organiza-
tion are thus `grown' as the outcome of processes of interaction between
boundedly rational agents adaptively searching for `good' organization.
Keywords: governance, trust, matching, articial adaptive agents
JEL Classication: C63, C78, D83, L22
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1 Introduction
This paper is concerned with the organization of transactions of goods or ser-
vices between stages of activity. Two consecutive stages might be brought
together within a single rm|using hierarchy to organize transactions be-
tween the stages; or the dierent stages could be distributed across separate,
specialized rms|using the market to organize transactions between them.
Other organizational forms `between market and hierarchy' could also be used.
According to transaction cost economics (Coase 1937, Williamson 1985), the
decision between these alternatives is made by `aligning' organizational form
with the attributes of the transaction to be organized.
In the current paper, it is attempted to deal with Coase's (1998, p. 73) recent
observation that \[w]e cannot conne our analysis to what happens within a
single rm", but that \[w]hat we are dealing with is a complex interrelated
structure" (Coase 1995, p. 245). Furthermore, although TCE builds its main
`discrete alignment hypothesis' on the assumption that economic agents are
boundedly rational and potentially opportunistic, we submit that it is precisely
their bounded rationality that may prevent economic agents from performing
this alignment successfully, especially in the context of the complex interre-
lated structures that Coase (1995) suggests we are dealing with. Therefore, in-
stead of searching for optimal mechanisms of governance that rms should (but
may never) use, we use computer simulations to model the process by which
agents adaptively search for satiscing|rather than optimal|organizational
forms, to generate hypotheses about which forms economic agents (come to)
use.
The next section discusses governance in more detail. Networks of rms are
viewed as complex systems containing adaptive agents (Holland 1992, Holland
and Miller 1991), as discussed in Section 3. Section 4 introduces `matching',
the tool used to build Coase's (1995) complex interrelated structures from
individual rms' preferences for dierent organizational forms. Section 5 de-
velops the computer simulation model in which these complex interrelated
structures are build in each of a sequence of timesteps, while rms may adapt
their preferences from each timestep to the next. Results from experimen-




The unit of analysis in TCE, as its name suggests, is the transaction. \A
transaction occurs when a good or service is transferred across a technolog-
ically separable interface. One stage of activity terminates and another be-
gins" (Williamson 1981a, p. 552). Rather than focus on individual stages of
activity|viewing the rm as a production function to be optimized|TCE
focuses on transactions between stages of activity and views the rm as one of
the organizational forms that may be used to organize such transactions. The
core of the argument is that the rm and the market are alternative forms for
organizing transactions, that transactions carry costs (transaction costs) and
that the various organizational forms have dierential abibilities to economize
on these costs, so that for some transactions, it is economic to organize them
within a rm's hierarchy rather than on the market.
The interchangeability of market and hierarchy in this respect was recog-
nized for the rst time by Coase (1937), who received the 1991 Nobel Prize in
Economics for his discovery of the signicance of transaction costs in elucidat-
ing The Nature of the Firm; Olson (1965)
1
and Williamson (1975) followed
up on Coase's insights, distinguishing market and hierarchy as alternatives.
Later on, Williamson (1979, p. 234) additionally acknowledged some \inter-
mediate modes of organization", \in which bilateral dependency conditions
are supported by a variety of specialized governance features (hostages, ar-
bitration, take-or-pay procurement clauses, tied sales, reciprocity, regulation,
etc.)" (Williamson 1991, p. 269).
Solving governance problems in particular circumstances requires, according
to TCE, that organizational form (`governance') is aligned with the attributes
of the transaction to be organized, in a discriminating|mainly transaction
cost economizing|way; in general, the trade-o should be considered between
costs of transaction, organization and production. As for the attributes, a
transaction occurs with a certain frequency, is surrounded by a certain degree
1
Olson (1965, p. 12) writes about \economic organizations that are mainly means through
which individuals attempt to obtain the same things they obtain through their activities on
the market".
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of uncertainty, and, most importantly, is supported by investments in assets
with a certain degree of specicity, i.e. the extent to which those assets can
not be redeployed outside the transaction and make sustaining the transaction
a necessary condition for obtaining returns on investments in them. Because
of the rst of TCE's two behavioral assumptions|that agents are boundedly
rational|contracts are necessarily incomplete, so that before the end of the
period during which the transaction needs to be sustained, unforeseen con-
tingencies may arise to which the parties will have to adapt. However, when
separate, autonomous rms are involved, then because of TCE's second behav-
ioral assumption|that agents are potentially opportunistic|this adaptation
can not be assumed to be cooperative (i.e. in their mutual interest), but will
rather result in costly haggling over the distribution of the unforeseen gains
or losses (Williamson 1981a). When organizing a transaction between such
separate autonomous rms, therefore, the potential loss of returns on invest-
ments in specic assets, as well as the probability of that loss, increase with
the specicity of the assets. With increasing specicity, the costs of safeguard-
ing against the expected loss eventually become so high that the transaction
should be removed from the market and organized within the rm, where
adaptation is more likely to be cooperative and the costs lower.
3 Complex adaptive systems
3.1 Complex systems . . .
Recently, the founding father of transaction cost reasoning, Coase (1995, p.
245), noted that
\[t]he analysis cannot be conned to what happens within a single
rm. The costs of coordination within a rm and the level of
transaction costs that it faces are aected by its ability to purchase
inputs from other rms, and their ability to supply these inputs
depends in part on their costs of coordination and the level of
transaction costs that they face which are similarly aected by
what these are in still other rms. What we are dealing with is a
complex interrelated structure."
4
Holland (1992) and Holland and Miller (1991) suggest to study economic sys-
tems as `complex adaptive systems', where a complex adaptive system (CAS)
\is a complex system containing adaptive agents, networked so that the envi-
ronment of each adaptive agent includes other agents in the system" (Holland
and Miller 1991, p. 365). The CAS approach thus appears to be ideally suited
to deal with Coase's (1995) observation, which is what is attempted in the
current paper.
3.2 . . . and adaptive agents
It is granted that TCE assumes bounded rationality, albeit for the sole purpose
of rendering problematic the combination of asset specicity and opportunism;
all three are needed as conditions for the existence of rms, i.e. conditions
under which the market looses (some or even all of) its advantage because of
increasing transaction costs.
2
However, after assuming bounded rationality
(for this purpose), TCE goes on to hypothesize alignment of transactions
with governance structures, while it is precisely their bounded rationality that
may prevent economic agents from successfully performing this alignment,
especially in the context of the `complex interrelated structures' that Coase
(1995) suggests we are dealing with.
In this paper, therefore, a dierent approach than the application of the
mathematical logic of economic optimization (or `alignment') will be taken to
generate propositions about how economic activity is organized. Individual,
boundedly rational economic agents are simulated in a computational model,
along with the decentralized trades they initiate between each other. As in
Vriend's (1995, p. 205) model, then, \market interactions depend in a crucial
way on local knowledge of the identity of some potential trading partners".
The agents themselves decide whether they want to make or buy. Moreover,
the option to `buy' really just consists of a number of alternatives to buy
from. A market has to be `made', before it can ever used as a governance
2
These conditions, by the way, although necessary, are not necessarily sucient. The
theory says that under these circumstances rms may exist, but it does not explain how
they come into existence: it species the conditions under which rms have a comparative
advantage over markets, but not what is required for this advantage to be translated into
the actual emergence of rms (cf. Axtell 1999), which is addressed in the current paper|it
can not be done within TCE's conceptual framework.
5
form (Vriend 1995, Vriend 1996, Weisbuch et al. 1998). Rather than rely
on standard, anonymous random matching devices, these decisions are also
explicitely incorporated in the model. Agents are assumed to have dierential
preferences for dierent potential trading partners (Weisbuch et al. 1998).
Economic organization is studied from the bottom up (cf. Epstein and Axtell
1996); the resulting distribution of economic activity across dierent organi-
zational forms emerges from processes of interaction between these agents, as
they adapt future decisions to past experiences. The system may or may not
settle down and if it does, the resulting equilibrium may or may not be trans-
action cost economic; in any case, \[i]t is the process of becoming rather than
the never-reached end points that we must study if we are to gain insight"
(Holland 1992, p. 19).
3.3 Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE)
\[T]he specialization to economics of the basic Complex Adaptive Systems
(CAS) paradigm"
3
described above, goes under the name Agent-based Com-
putational Economics (ACE). This approach is used more and more often to
study problems in economics, such as in the repeated prisoner's dilemma (Klos
1999, Miller 1996, Stanley et al. 1994), social dilemmas (Glance and Huberman
1994) and on nal-goods markets (Albin and Foley 1992, Vriend 1995), stock
markets (Arthur et al. 1997), industrial markets (Peli and Nooteboom 1997),
whole-sale markets (Kirman and Vriend 1998, Weisbuch et al. 1998), labor
markets (Tesfatsion 1999), spatial political models (Kollman et al. 1992, Miller
and Stadler 1998), etc. As shown in the current application, the ACE-approach
is also very well suited for studying economic organization.
The essence of this approach is that economic phenomena are studied as
they emerge from actual (simulated) interactions between individual, bound-
edly rational, adaptive agents. They are not deduced from abstract models
employing representative agents, auctioneers or anonymous, random match-
ing, etc. Rather, whether an interaction takes place between any two given
agents is left for them to decide. What the agents subsequently do in that in-
teraction is their own|possibly sub-optimal|decision, that they make on the
3
Quoted from the ACE website, maintained by Leigh Tesfatsion at:
http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/ace.htm
6
basis of their locally available, incomplete information and as a result of their
own (cognitively-limited) processing of that information. Appropriate forms
of reasoning are induction and abduction, rather than deduction as used in
optimization models that are solved for `never-reached end points'.
4 Matching
The crucial insight underlying our model of rms attempting to solve problems
of organization, is that their choices between market or hierarchy can also be
seen as the result of a process in which buyers are assigned to suppliers or
to themselves, respectively. Such a process, in turn, can be generated by
executing a so-called matching algorithm. The simulation model presented
in Section 5, therefore, uses such a matching algorithm;
4
the current section
describes the algorithm in some detail.
A matching algorithm produces a set of matches (a matching) on the basis of
individual agents' preference rankings over other agents. Besides a preference
ranking, each agent maintains a `minimum tolerance level' that determines
which other agents are acceptable, namely those agents that are somehow
`better' than the agent's minimum tolerance level; agents will not (want to)
be matched to other agents they deem unacceptable. Finally, each agent has a
maximum number of matches it can be involved in at any one time (a quotum).
The algorithm used is Tesfatsion's (1996) deferred choice and refusal (DCR)
algorithm, which extends
5
Gale and Shapley's (1962) deferred acceptance al-
gorithm.
6
The DCR algorithm is used with some qualications. First of all,
only disjoint sets of buyers and suppliers are allowed, so that there are no
agents that can be buyer as well as supplier. So, although buyers may be
their own supplier, they can not supply to other buyers. Furthermore, we
4
See (Roth and Sotomayor 1990) for an excellent introduction to and overview of matching
theory.
5
To be precise, the DCR algorithm allows both sides of the market to be coincident,
overlapping or disjoint, and it also allows arbitrarily specied oer and acceptance quota.
6
These algorithms produce stable matchings, which are matchings that have no blocking
(pairs of) agents, i.e. (pairs of) agents who can (bi- or) unilaterally improve upon their actual
situation under the matching by|rather than to their actual match|being matched to (each
other or) themselves. The DCR algorithm was used because it provides a way of assigning
agents to each other, not because it produces stable matchings; in the current application,
stability is just a side-eect.
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allow dierent agents to have dierent quota|i.e. dierent maximum num-
bers of matches allowed at any moment in time|because dierent buyers and
suppliers are likely to want dierent numbers of partners. Finally, and most
importantly, unlike the DCR algorithm, we do allow buyers to be matched to
themselves, in which case they are their own supplier. Each buyer includes
itself as one of the alternatives in its preference ranking, and suppliers not
ranking higher than the buyer are unacceptable. This eectively endogenizes
the buyer's preferences for dierent organizational forms; a buyer prefers to
remain single (and `make') rather than `buy' from an unacceptable supplier.
The argument is that buyers on industrial markets don't necessarily need a
supplier to make a prot; they can choose to make rather than buy what
they need. On nal goods markets, the agents on both sides of the market
are qualitatively dierent from one another: consumers are individual people
but rms are groups of individuals; people can not do certain things that or-
ganizations can do. On industrial markets, the agents on both sides of the
market are rms, so that a buyer-rm may perform the same functions as a
supplier-rm|albeit less eciently because the buyer does not specialize in
performing those functions|and thereby economize on the costs of coordinat-
ing the transaction with the supplier-rm; determining whether the buyer-rm
should or should not perform a function itself is at the heart of transaction
cost economic reasoning.
7
The algorithm Buyers may have one or more suppliers and suppliers may
have one or more buyers; each buyer b has an oer quotum, o
b
( 1) and each
supplier s has an acceptance quotum, a
s
( 1). Before the matching, all buyers
and suppliers establish a strict preference ranking over all their alternatives.
The algorithm then proceeds in a nite number of steps.
1. In the rst step, each buyer sends a maximum of o
b
requests to its
most preferred, acceptable suppliers.
8
Because the buyers typically have
7
Recently, theories have been developed from the `competence perspective' (see, e.g.,
Nooteboom 1992, Peli and Nooteboom 1997), that stress other arguments for rms to set
up relations with other rms. The extensions of transaction cost economics proposed in the
current paper also go in that direction.
8
The algorithm structurally favors the agents that send the requests; buyers seem more
plausible than suppliers in that respect.
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dierent preference rankings, the various suppliers will receive dierent
numbers of requests.
2. The suppliers rst reject all requests received from unacceptable buyers.
9
Then, each supplier `provisionally accepts' a maximum of a
s
requests
from its most preferred acceptable buyers and rejects the rest (if any).
3. Each buyer that was rejected in any step lls its quotum o
b
in the next
step by sending requests to (o
b
minus the number of outstanding, pro-
visionally accepted, requests) next-most-preferred, acceptable suppliers
that it has not yet sent a request to.
4. Each supplier again rejects requests received from unacceptable buy-
ers and provisionally accepts the requests from a maximum of a
s
most
preferred, acceptable buyers from among newly received and previously
provisionally accepted requests and rejects the rest. As long as one or
more buyers have been rejected, the algorithms goes back to step 3.
The algorithm stops if no buyer sends a request that is rejected. All provision-
ally accepted requests are then denitely accepted. An example-application
of this matching algorithm is presented in Appendix A.1.
5 The simulation model
Firms sell a dierentiated product on a nal-goods market; the simulation
model, however, really only captures the industrial market on which these
rms are buyers, possibly interacting with suppliers. Governance pertains to
the transaction between the production and the sales of the product. Each rm
always sells the product himself, and chooses to either produce the product
himself, or let a supplier produce it for him, in which case the rm is a buyer.
These choices are generated by the DCR matching algorithm: each buyer
is either matched to a supplier or to himself, expressing his choice between
market- and hierarchichal governance, respectively. The simulation-dynamic
9
For the moment, we assume that all buyers are acceptable to the suppliers; suppliers
do not, like the buyers, have any alternative, so they will rather supply to any buyer than
remain single. It might be investigated, however, whether for a supplier it is worthwhile to
also use a tolerance level for protection against being exploited by buyers.
9
refers to the fact that the algorithm is applied in each of a sequence of discrete
timesteps. The outcome of the matching in each timestep is determined by the
agents' preference rankings over acceptable alternatives, while the agents may
change their preference ranking from each timestep to the next.
After the matching in each timestep, suppliers that are matched to a buyer
produce for their buyer(s), while buyers that are `self-matched' (not matched
to a supplier) produce for themselves. Assets that suppliers invest in for the
production for a certain buyer, are specic to that buyer to the extent that
the buyer's product is dierentiated; the remainder of the assets is `general
purpose'. Suppliers enjoy scale-economies in accumulated general purpose as-
sets used in the production for multiple buyers. Furthermore, as their relation
lasts longer, a supplier becomes more ecient at using specic assets in the
production for a particular buyer. After the production, all buyers sell their
products on the nal-goods market. The events in this latter part of each
timestep|i.e., after the matching|may lead the agents to adapt their pref-
erence rankings, used by the DCR algorithm in the next timestep. The way
preferences are established is described in the next section (5.1). Section 5.2
discusses the implementation of the simulation.
5.1 Preferences
The preferences used in the matching process are based on so-called `scores'
that each agent x assigns to all the agents y it can possibly be matched to:
score
xy
expresses the prot that x expects to make as a result of coordinating
a transaction with y (in a buyer's case, y may be equal to x). It is a function
of (1) the prot x can potentially make as a result of coordinating the trans-
action with y and (2) x's trust in y, which is interpreted as x's assessment of
the probability that y will let x realize that prot potential|i.e. the proba-
bility that y will not behave opportunistically. In order to be able to allow
agents to attach dierent weights to protability versus trust, however, simple
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, i.e. the `prot-elasticity' of the
scores that x assigns. It is the value of 
x
that xmay adapt from each timestep
to the next. The next two sections (5.1.1 and 5.1.2, respectively) describe how
protability and trust are determined.
5.1.1 Protability
A buyer's potential to generate prots for a supplier is a function of the buyer's
position on the nal market|where he is a seller|as expressed in the degree
of product dierentiation on the market. A supplier's potential to generate
prots for a buyer is determined by the supplier's eciency in producing for
the buyer.
Product dierentiation The model allows for varying degrees of product
dierentiation, i.e. price/cost ratios: not all the rms in an industry sell the
same, homogeneous product, or at least, consumers perceive dierent rms'
products as being imperfect substitutes. Consumers have idiosyncratic tastes
and rms' products have dierent characteristics, which means that, relative
to its competitors' products, each rm's product variant is more or less unique.
Because \consumers (. . . ) are prepared to pay more for variants that are better
suited to their own tastes" (Anderson et al. 1992, p. 1), rms that sell those
particular variants have some degree of `market power': they can raise the
price for which they sell their product, without losing at least some of their
customers to competitors, as long as the extent to which their product is better
suited to those customers' tastes|relative to their competitors' products|
more than osets the price-increase. This degree of market power will be
expressed in a buyer-specic variable d
b
2 [0; 1] that determines the prot the
buyer will make when selling his products. We will be experimenting with
dierent values for d
b
to see how they aect the choices that buyers make.
Eciency As set out above, a buyer's choice of organizational form pertains
to the transaction between the production of a product on the one hand, and
the sales of that product on the other hand. A buyer will either be self-matched
and produce the product himself, or be matched to a supplier who produces
11
it for him. A supplier, on the other hand, may be matched to multiple buyers
for which she produces a particular product.
10
Whoever does it, producing a product requires assets to be invested in|1
unit of assets is required to produce 1 product, but increasing eciency may
decrease this amount. Since \asset specicity is never valued by itself but
only because demand is thereby increased in design or performance respects"
(Williamson 1981a, p. 558), we will assume a relation between the dieren-
tiation of a buyer's product, and the specicity of the assets invested in to
produce that product. The rationale is that, if a buyer i's product is dier-
entiated (d
i
> 0), then, relative to consumers' tastes, i's product is dierent
from his competitors' products. Assets invested in to produce i's product can
then not easily be switched to the production of those competitors' (dierent)
products. In other words, those assets are then specic to the production of i's
product. On the other hand, if products are not dierentiated, then they are
all the same, and assets invested in to produce the product for one buyer can
easily be switched to producing products for other buyers. The simplest way
to model this relation, is to assume that asset specicity is equal to product
dierentiation, i.e. the proportion of the asset required to produce a product
for a buyer that is specic to that buyer, is equal to the extent to which that
buyer's product is dierentiated.
If a buyer produces for himself, it makes no sense to distinguish between
buyer-specic and non-specic assets.
11
A buyer calculates his own score (his
minimum tolerance level) using eciency = 0, trust = 1 and  = 1. If a
supplier produces for one or more buyers, however, then the assets she invests
in, are split into two categories: buyer-specic and non-specic|i.e. general
purpose|assets. As explained above, the percentage of the 1 unit required
10
A more general version of the model would allow for the possibility of multiple compo-
nents per product and for multiple sources per component. A buyer may then be matched
to the same or to dierent suppliers for the production of the various components; a single
supplier may attain economies of scope in the production of dierent components for the
buyer (see Williamson 1981b, note 18, p. 1547), whereas multiple suppliers may gain (exter-
nal) economies of cognitive scope in their production for the buyer (cf. Nooteboom 1992, Peli
and Nooteboom 1997).
11
Remember that overlap between both sides of the market is not allowed, which takes
away the possibility for buyers to replicate the market's production cost advantage by pro-
ducing for themselves as well as for their competitors.
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for each buyer that is specic to that buyer, is the same as the extent to
which that buyer's product is dierentiated. The supplier adds the remaining,
general purpose part for each buyer, across all the buyers she is matched to.
We will assume that the supplier's continuous use of buyer-specic assets is
subject to learning-by-doing, and that the supplier's accumulation of general
purpose assets across the production for multiple buyers, is subject to scale






































Figure 1: Eciency of scale and of learning-by-doing.
If the x-axis measures a supplier's accumulation of general-purpose assets
in the production for multiple buyers, then the y-axis gives the supplier's
scale-eciency in using those general-purpose assets. The number of general-







is the dierentiation of buyer i's products and e
s;j
is
supplier j's scale eciency, which is the function value in Figure 1 of supplier
12
Dierent values for the a-parameter may be used for the two functions. In the program,
the parameter for the scale-eciency function is scaleFactor, while the parameter for the
learning-eciency function is learnFactor.
13
j's total number of general purpose assets, accumulated across all the buyers
she is matched to. If the x-axis measures the number of consecutive matches
between a supplier and a buyer, then the y-axis gives the supplier's buyer-
specic eciency in using assets, specic for that buyer.
13
The number of









is supplier j's `learning eciency' (eciency due to
learning by doing) for buyer i, which is the function value in Figure 1, of the
number of consecutive matches between buyer i and supplier j.
The graph shows that a supplier can be more scale-ecient than a buyer
producing for himself only if the scale at which she produces is larger than
the maximum scale with which a buyer might produce for itself: the graph is
positive only for more than 1 general purpose assets. Furhermore, a supplier's
buyer-specic eciency is 0 in their rst transaction, and only starts to in-
crease if the number of transactions is larger than 1, which implements TCE's
fundamental transformation, according to which (Williamson 1981b, p. 1548),
\[w]hat may have been (and commonly is) an eective large-num-
bers-bidding situation at the outset is sometimes transformed into
a bilateral trading relation thereafter. This obtains if, despite the
fact that large numbers of qualied bidders were prepared to enter
competitive bids for the initial contract, the winning bidder realizes
advantages over nonwinners at contract renewal intervals because
nontrivial investments in durable specic assets are put in place
(or otherwise accrue, say in a learning-by-doing fashion) during
contract execution."
In the current model, the emphasis is put on the second option mentioned
(between brackets). The relative eects of investments in durable specic
assets vs. learning-by-doing advantages will be the subject of future work.
In summary: protability
xy
The way prots are made, then, is that
suppliers may reduce costs by generating eciencies for buyers, while buyers
may increase returns, when they sell more dierentiated products. The prot
13
For now, the same function is used for both relations, although a learning curve is usually
represented by a sigmoid function (cf. Simon and Blume 1994, p. 365).
14
that is made resulting from both partners' contributions, is shared equally
between the buyer and the supplier involved.
5.1.2 Trust
TCE assumes potential opportunism. In the model, opportunism means that
an agent may break a `relation', i.e. a sequence of matches, without taking the
partner into account. If agents know that their partner may be opportunistic,
they can assign a probability to the event of their partner behaving opportunis-
tically. This probability is 1 minus the probability that the partner does not
behave opportunistically, which we will call the agent's trust in the partner.
Following Gulati (1995), we will assume trust to increase with the duration of
a relation: as a relation lasts longer, one starts to take the partner's behavior
for granted, and to assume the same behavior (i.e. commitment, rather than
breaking the relation) for the future. In the model, this increase over time
is implemented using a variation of the function presented in Figure 1. The
addition is a base-level of trust:







where b is the base-level of trust and x is the number of consecutive matches
the agents have been involved in. The parameter a is again a dierent one
than in the functions for scale- and learning-eciency. In the program, this
parameter is called trustFactor.
Technically, a base-level is desirable because if  = 1, the exponent on
trust is 0, and the base-level prevents trust from becoming 0 (0
0
is undened,
and makes the program crash). Theoretically, Hill (1990) also assumes that
a certain proportion of the population will never be opportunistic, so that
proportion may be taken as the agents' minimum probability-assessment that
their partner will not be opportunistic; another interpretation is that this
reects a certain elementary decency in the population. Figure 2 shows the
relation we assume between the past duration of a relation and agents' trust
in each other (depending on an agent-specic value for the a-parameter in the
function; i.c. a = :5).
A relation is broken if, during the matching, a buyer does not send any more














y, involved in a relation with an agent x `breaks' their relation, then x's trust
in y decreases; in eect, x's trust drops by a certain factor (< 1) times the
distance between the current level and the base-line level of trust; it stays
there until the next time x and y are matched, after which is starts to increase
again.
5.2 Implementation
5.2.1 Agent-based, object-oriented programming
The simulation was developed in the general-purpose, object-oriented pro-
gramming language SIMULA (Birtwistle et al. 1973). The object-oriented
paradigm is very well suited for agent-based modeling (see McFadzean and
Tesfatsion 1996, Epstein and Axtell 1996), and for real-world modeling in
general, which was the philosophy underlying the development of SIMULA
as the rst object-oriented language. Although the original language (SIM-
ULA I) was a SIMUlation LAnguage, the second and nal version, SIMULA
67 (nowadays just called SIMULA), is a general-purpose language, and the
acronym now stands for SIMple Universal LAnguage. Object-oriented tech-
nology `simulates' the real-world, which gives it several desirable properties.
Object-oriented programs are modular; the modules are described in classes.
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These serve as `templates' for the creation (instantiation) of objects, which
represent actual objects in the real world. Classes consist of declarations of
data (properties, attributes) and methods (behavior) that operate on those
data. Subclasses may be dened that inherit the data and methods of the
superclass, and may be re-dened or supplemented with data and methods
specic for the subclass. Objects may also send messages to other objects.
Object-oriented programming thus consists of specifying classes. If a program
is run, the objects interact with each other by sending messages.
5.2.2 Simulation
The simulation proceeds as a sequence of discrete timesteps (see the pseudo-
code listing for the simulation program in Table 1). Such a sequence is called
a `run'; each simulation experiment may be replicated several times (multi-
ple runs), to reduce the inuence of draws from random distributions on the
results. During the step initialize simulation in Table 1, certain parame-
ters are set for the simulation as a whole. The user is prompted to supply the
number of buyers and suppliers, as well as the number of runs, and the number
of timesteps in each run. The program's random number generator is seeded
and nally, the agents are instantiated and given a number for identication.
There is a general class agent, from which two subclasses, buyerAgent and
supplierAgent are derived. The general class contains data and methods
(called `procedures' in SIMULA) that all agents have in common. They are
`inherited' by the two subclasses and supplemented with data and methods
that are specic for buyers and suppliers, respectively (see Appendix A.2).
5.2.3 Runs
The program then contains a set of nested for-loops, which control the required
runs and, per run, the required timesteps: the statement
For run:=1 Step 1 Until totalRuns Do: {...}
lets the {...}-part be executed totalRuns times|i.e. as many times as the
value of the variable totalRuns. The statement sets the variable run to 1 and




For run:=1 Step 1 Until totalRuns Do:
f
initialize agents;
For timestep:=1 Step 1 Until totalTimesteps Do:
f
For agent:=1 Step 1 Until totalAgents Do:
f





For supplier:=1 Step 1 Until totalSuppliers Do:
If matched Then produce and deliver;
For buyer:=1 Step 1 Until totalBuyers Do:
If not matched Then produce;
For buyer:=1 Step 1 Until totalBuyers Do:
sell;





Table 1: Pseudo-code for the simulations.
of run is smaller than or equal to the value of totalRuns, the {...}-part is
executed, otherwise the program continues after the closing }.
At the start of each run, each of the agents is initialized. For example, the
agents' prots (from the previous run) are re-set to zero and the agents' trust
in other agents is re-set.
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After this agent-initialization, the actual simulation
starts, consisting of a sequence of timesteps.
14




The matching algorithm is applied to the agents in each timestep, while the
agents may adapt their preferences for other agents from each timestep to the
next. In each timestep, before matching takes place, each agent chooses a value
for  to calculate scores with, calculates scores, and ranks (potential) part-
ners on the basis of these scores, using randomdraws to settle the ranking of
alternatives with equal scores. Then, the agents are matched by the matching
algorithm; suppliers that are matched to a buyer produce for and deliver to
that buyer, while suppliers that are not matched do nothing; buyers that are
not matched produce for themselves. Then, the buyers sell their products on
the nal-goods market|whether produced by their supplier or by themselves.
Finally, at the end of each timestep, the agents do some updating on the basis
of their experiences during the timestep.
The description of each of these events follows. What happens before the
matching in any timestep (except the rst, in which this is trivial)
15
is inu-
enced by the events after the matching in the previous timestep. These latter
events are therefore discussed rst.
The matching Two 2-dimensional `arrays' (matrices) are maintained in the
program, in which connections (matches) before and after execution of the
matching algorithm are stored. Right before each matching, the entries in the
array of current connections are copied into the array of previous connections,
and the array of current connections is cleared: the matching algorithm starts
from scratch in each timestep and after it has nished, the resulting matches
are stored in the array of current connections. Then, right after the matching,
the entries in the two matrices are compared for each pair of agents, and the
result of this comparison is classied as one of the following events in the
life-cycle of a relation.
16
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Before the rst matching, all buyers are the same for each supplier and vice versa.
Because the matching algorithm needs strict preferences and random draws are used to
break ties between alternatives with equal scores, all agents' preference rankings in the rst
timestep are random.
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If two agents are matched to each other neither before nor after the matching, then there
is, of course, no event in a relation's life-cycle that this corresponds to.
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Start: two agents start a relation if they are matched to each other in a
certain timestep, while they were not matched in the previous timestep.
Continue: two agents continue a relation if they are matched to each other
in a certain timestep, while they were also matched to each other in the
previous timestep. If a relation continues, the agents' trust in each other
increases, as does the supplier's eciency in using buyer-specic assets
(if any).
Break: a relation breaks if, while two agents were matched to each other in
the previous timestep, either the buyer does not send a request to the
supplier or he does, but the supplier rejects the request. If a relation
breaks, the trust of the agent who did not break the relation in the agent
who did, decreases.
These events and the agents' perception, interpretation and evaluation of them
may trigger reactions that may lead the agents to change their preference
ranking, which, in the next timestep, may change the outcome of the matching
and trigger the occurrence of further events.
Production and trade Producing one product requires (at most) one unit
of assets|increasing eciency decreases this amount. A buyer always pro-
duces with eciency 0 if he chooses to make,
17
so he always needs 1 unit of
assets to produce one product, costing 1 monetary unit. Buyer i's prospects
when making, then, are as depicted in Figure 3. A supplier, on the other hand,
may enjoy economies due to scale and due to learning by doing, as explained
in Section 5.1.1. The dierence between unity and the supplier's costs are
the savings that the supplier generates, and the prices at which the supplier's
production is traded with each of her buyers is such that these savings are
shared equally between the buyer and the supplier. Finally, when the buyer
sells his products, the price he receives is a function of the dierentiation of his
products. If the buyer has bought, rather than made, then like the supplier's
17
A buyer is not allowed to produce for and supply to other buyers (his competitors), so
he can not generate scale-economies. Learning-by-doing is also not possible for the buyer,
because savings resulting from this are assumed to be related to the advantage due to the
cognitive distance between the buyer and his supplier (cf. Nooteboom's (1992) external












Figure 3: A buyer's returns, costs, and prot when making.
savings, any returns resulting from dierentiation are shared equally between
the buyer and the supplier. This means that when a buyer i buys from a



















is the dierentiation of buyer i's products, e
i
l;j
is supplier j's learning
eciency for buyer i, and e
s;j
is supplier j's scale eciency. If the buyer buys,
therefore, he faces the situation presented in Figure 4. The buyer's returns are
the same as in Figure 3; his costs are unity minus half of the supplier's savings
due to scale- and learning-eciency, and he also shares half of his returns from
product dierentiation with the supplier (`costs(d)').
It follows, in Figure 5, that the buyer's prots when buying fall anywhere
inbetween the lines `min.prot(b)' and `max.prot(b)'. Compared to the buy-
er's situation when making (the line `prot(m)'), buying is more attractive|in
terms of potentially attainable prots|when dierentiation (and therefore as-
set specicity) is low, than when it is high, which is in line with transaction
cost intuition.
Updating An agent in a CAS is adaptive if \the actions of the agent in its
















Figure 4: A buyer's costs when buying. The plot for `costs(d)'|the buyer's
sharing of his returns from dierentiation with the supplier|coincides with
the plot for `min.costs(learn)'.
the like); and the agent behaves in such a way as to improve this value over
time" (Holland and Miller 1991, p. 365; see also (Vriend 1995)). The adaptive
character of the articial agents in the model refers to the possibility for the
agents to change the value they use for  from each timestep to the next, which
leads to a change in the scores they assign to dierent agents and to a dierent
preference-ranking. Each agent has several possible values for  2 [0; 1]; the
number is a parameter in the simulation. To each value, each agent assigns a
strength,
18
which expresses the agent's condence in the success of using that
particular value; the various strenghts always add up to a constant C.
The strength of the value that was chosen for  at the start of a particular
timestep (see below), is updated at the end of that timestep, on the basis of the
agent's performance during that timestep, which is assumed to be related to
the value of  used. Updating means that the agent adds the prot obtained
during the timestep to the strength of the value used for . After this, the
three strengths are renormalized to sum to C again (see (Arthur 1993) for
18
See (Arthur 1991, Arthur 1993, Kirman and Vriend 1998, Lane 1993) for discussions
and applications of these so-called `classier systems' to models in economics; good general












Figure 5: A buyer's prots when making or buying.
a discussion of this learning mechanism). This is done by multiplying each
of them with the ratio C=(C+prot). At this point, as an output of the
simulation, each agent x's weighted average value for 
x
|the `prot-elasticity'










This indicates where x's emphasis lies: because the value with the highest
strength pulls the weighted average in its direction, the emphasis lies on low
values for  if the weighted average 
x
is low and vice versa.
Choosing  The process of updating described in the previous paragraph
concludes each timestep. The next timestep starts with each agent choosing
a value to be used for  when calculating other agents' scores. The choice
between the dierent possible values for  is probabilistic|a simple roulette
wheel selection|with each value's selection probability equal to its relative
strength, i.e. its strength divided by C.
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Calculating scores As explained above, scores are Cobb-Douglas functions














is the score x assigns to y, protability
xy
is the prot x may
make `through' y, trust
xy
is x's trust in y and 
x





, i.e. the `prot-elasticity' of the
scores that x assigns.
Before a matching, the agents determine other agents' scores on the basis of
suppliers' scale-eciency in the previous timestep. Only after the matching
does it become clear to how many and which buyers each supplier is actually
matched, and what the real extent of her scale-eciency is. Expectations
of the supplier's position on each buyer-specic learning curve, on the other
hand, will already be accurate before the matching|assuming, of course, that
the relation makes it through the matching.
6 Results: adaptive governance
Experiments were run with the parameters and variables as shown in the right-
most column of Table 4 in Appendix A.3. The value for product dierentiation
was varied in 6 experiments, each of which was run for 250 timesteps and
replicated 25 times: results are typically presented as averages over those
25 runs. Before going to the results, it is worthwhile to consider what may
be expected from the simulations. The experimental variable `dierentiation'
of the buyers' products is tied to the specicity of the assets that suppliers
invest in to support their production for those buyers. Initially, therefore, the
buyers are confronted with the score-dierentials given in Table 2. The values






















with the supplier's initial learning-eciency for buyer i, e
i
l;j
= 0, the suppli-
er's initial eciency of scale, e
s;j
= 0 and buyer i's initial trust in supplier
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d 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
0.25 0.50 0.23 0.06 -0.05 -0.13
0.35 0.40 0.17 0.01 -0.10 -0.18
0.45 0.30 0.11 -0.04 -0.15 -0.23
0.55 0.20 0.03 -0.10 -0.20 -0.28
0.65 0.10 -0.04 -0.16 -0.25 -0.33
0.75 0.00 -0.12 -0.22 -0.30 -0.38
Table 2: Dierence between suppliers' initial scores and a buyer's own score




= 0:75. The score that buyer i assigns to himself is equal to d
i
, be-
cause that is his prot when he makes and he uses  = 1 to calculate his
own score. The values in the table give the dierence between these two;
initially (in the rst timestep), these values are the same for all buyers. As
dierentiation increases, the number of distinct values for  that yield a net
score-advantage for suppliers|which they need for buyers to consider them
acceptable|decreases. If d = 0:75, there is no value for  that gives suppliers
a net advantage so we may expect no outsourcing at all in that case. Notice
that for any d < 0:75, no matter how much smaller, the suppliers do have a net
advantage, which, furthermore, if matches do occur, increases over time with
suppliers' increasing learning eciency and also when suppliers are matched
to more than 1 buyer. The situation in Table 2, therefore, is likely to shift in
favor of suppliers as time progresses. In general, then, we would expect more
making (and less buying) when dierentiation increases.
The proportion of economic activity under hierarchichal (as opposed to mar-
ket) governance in the dierent experiments is shown in Figure 6. This shows
that, as expected, the proportion made is higher when dierentiation is high
than when it is low, and if d = 0:75, nothing is bought; the buyers make
everything themselves (the plot for d = 0:75 coincides with the top border
of the graph). Notice however, that in all experiments, the proportion made
decreases during approximately the rst 20 timesteps, after which it increases
and more strongly so, when d is higher.
The corresponding plot for the buyers' average normalized prots is shown























Figure 6: Proportion `made' (as opposed to `bought').
clearer. Again, the plot for the case d = 0:75 coincides with the top border of
the graph. This normalized prot is the buyers' prot divided by the maximum
attainable prot, which is the prot they would make in a relation with a
supplier with maximum scale- and learning-eciency.
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Figure 7 shows, rst
of all, that the initial decrease in `proportion made' (see Figure 6) is `good'
for the buyers when dierentiation is low (their normalized prot increases
during this initial period), but `bad' when dierentiation is high, since the
theoretically most appropriate choice is to make when dierentiation is high.
Eventually, this is also what the agents learn. Furthermore, in several of the
experiments, the agents are performing poorer than they could be. This is
because `perfomance as it could be' is based on prot made in a relation with
a supplier with maximum scale- and learning-eciency. Since each supplier
can have a maximum of 3 buyers (a
s
= 3), this requires that the 12 buyers
together buy from only 4 suppliers. That this network conguration does
nog always emerge, is shown in Figure 8, which depicts the buyers' average
normalized prots in each of the 25 individual runs of experiment d = 0:35.
In this experiment, there are three levels at which average prots `stabilize';
19
This is corrected for the fact that the suppliers' scale-eciency is limited because their
acceptance quotum is set to 3; if a
s






























Figure 7: Buyers' normalized prots.
almost 1 (6 runs), and approximately 0.9 (15 runs) and 0.8 (4 runs). The rst
of these levels corresponds to the situation where the 12 buyers buy from 4
suppliers (with their maximum of 3 buyers each) and no buyer makes anything.
The second level corresponds to the situation where 9 buyers are consistently
matched to 3 suppliers and the other three buyers are either making or buying,
but not all three from the same supplier at the same time. Also, there is
much switching between suppliers in this case, so these three buyers form no
long-lasting relations. The nal level (0.8) corresponds to the situation when
even more buyers are not consistently buying from the same supplier who is
matched to her maximum number of buyers. If the simulation is re-run with
12 buyers but only 4 suppliers, most of the runs quickly lock in to the level 1
described above.
The corresponding weighted average  for the buyers, averaged over all buy-
ers, is displayed in Figure 9. The weighted average  goes up in all experi-
ments and more strongly when dierentiation is higher. When d = 0:75, there
is hardly any eect on this variable: because there is no outsourcing at all
in this case, the prot that is made is the same no matter which value was
used for , so no one value is better than the rest in this sense. Because the


















Figure 8: Buyers' normalized prots in 25 runs of experiment d = 0:35.
buyers do attain maximum normalized prot when dierentiation is higher,
the higher weighted average  that emerges in that case can be called optimal.
However, the buyers do not perform as well when dierentiation is low, which
implies that the weighted average  may not be optimal (too high or too low),
although the agents may not be aware of this. The optimum may be out of
reach of the path-dependent process of interaction and learning that unfolds
among the agents. When looking at the 25 individual runs of the experiment
d = 0:25, it appears that relatively high prots are correlated with no `making'
(only buying), and a relatively low weighted average ! Further research will
be done to investigate this further.
7 Conclusion
This study was motivated by the observation that, while the main hypoth-
esis of transaction cost economics is that agents are able to align organiza-
tional form with the attributes of transactions in a discriminating, (transac-
tion cost) economic way, the agents' bounded rationality may prevent them
from performing this alignment successfully, i.e. economically. An agent-based



























Figure 9: Buyers' weighted average .
ternative propositions about which organizational forms boundedly rational,
adaptive agents learn to use. It was shown that under some circumstances,
agents are indeed unable to optimize successfully, because the network they
form, along with other agents, may not evolve to an optimal conguration. The
agents learn `individually', and in this case (as in many others), a population
of agents pursuing their own self-interest does not|by any invisible hand|
lead to a globally optimal outcome; consequently, some of the gains from trade
are not reaped. This may be interpreted as an example of how \the analysis
cannot be conned to what happens within a single rm" (Coase 1995, p. 245).
An often-used technique in agent-based computational models is the genetic
algorithm (see (Holland and Miller 1991) for a discussion and (Miller 1996,
Tesfatsion 1999) for examples). A genetic algorithm (GA) is essentially a com-
putational search heuristic that simulates evolutionary processes of selection
and reproduction, operating on a population of potential solutions in its search
for the optimal solution. In ACE-models, it operates on individual agents' be-
havioral rules, and genetic operators are assumed to model cultural, rather
than genetic, transmission of ideas and behaviors. Using a GA, the optimal
distribution of economic activity may have been found in the current experi-
ments, but it is my opinion that a GA is not an accurate model of the learning
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of individual, boundedly rational agents that we have tried to capture in the
current application (cf. Klos 1999).
The appropriateness of GA's as a model of learning in economics is the sub-
ject of much debate (Brenner 1998, Chattoe 1998, Riechmann 1999); explicit
comparisons between social learning, modeled using a GA, and individual
learning are reported in (Klos 1999) and (Vriend 1998), among others. There,
it was shown that outcomes dier signicantly between the two approaches.
The GA comes out on top, but, in my opinion, at the expense of some very
strong modeling assumptions|that many authors implicitely impose|about
the extent of the agents' perception and computational capacity (see Klos 1999,
for a more detailed discussion). Tesfatsion (1999, p. 13{14, emphasis added)
is aware of this, given her observation that
\[a]n important caution is in order here, however. Given the ex-
tent of information currently allowed to agents during the evo-
lution step|i.e., knowledge of the complete strategies of all other
agents of the same type, whether expressed in interactions or not|
the evolution step is more appropriately interpreted as an itera-
tive stochastic search algorithm for determining potential equilib-
rium strategy congurations rather than as a cultural transmission
mechanism per se. The resulting earnings outcomes will be used in
subsequent work as benchmarks against which to assess the eec-
tiveness of more realistically modelled cultural transmission mech-
anisms".
According to Vriend (1998, p. 11), also, \the computational modeling choice
between individual and social learning algorithms should be made more care-
fully, since there may be signicant implications for the outcomes generated".
As in (Klos 1999), I do not want to say that GA's should not be used anymore,
but the choice of using them should be made with caution and they should
be used for the right purposes. In the current paper, for example, if in some
circumstances agents are unable to organize optimally, it would be interesting
to nd out what `optimal' would be in those settings, what is keeping the
agents from attaining it, and how they might go about reaching that opti-
mum. A GA might very well be used to nd out what the optimum is, but
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that result should not be interpreted as the outcome of a process of learning.
After all, it was because we question TCE's assumption that agents are able to
align optimally that the current project was undertaken, so we shouldn't then





For an example of the operation of the matching algorithm, consider Table 3,
which lists randomly generated preference rankings of 5 buyers over 5 suppliers
and vice versa. In addition, the buyers were placed at randomly generated
supplier
buyer 1 2 3 4 5
1 4,2 5,1 2,4 1,1 3,1
2 1,4 -,2 -,1 -,2 -,5
3 3,1 -,4 4,2 2,4 1,3
4 -,3 -,5 -,5 1,3 2,2
5 -,5 -,3 -,3 -,5 -,4
Table 3: Example preference-rankings in Gale and Shapley's (1962) format.
Buyer 1 ranks supplier 4 rst, 3 second, 5 third, etc. Supplier 1 ranks buyer
3 rst, 1 second, 4 third, etc. Buyer 2 has only one acceptable supplier (1); a
`-' means `unacceptable'.
positions on their own rankings (expressing their tolerance level) and suppliers
whose ranking was not higher than the buyer's own ranking are not acceptable
and therefore not listed.




= 1), the algorithm
produces the following steps.
1. Buyers 1, 2, 3 and 4 send requests to their most preferred suppliers, i.e.
4, 1, 5 and 4, respectively. The suppliers that receive only one request
accept those provisionally, while supplier 4 rejects the request from buyer
4 and provisionally accepts the request from buyer 1.
2. Buyer 4 sends a request to its next most preferred supplier, 5, who
accepts buyer 4's request and rejects buyer 3's already provisionally ac-
cepted request, because supplier 5 prefers buyer 4 to buyer 3.
3. Buyer 3 now sends a request to its next most preferred supplier, 4, which
request is rejected, because supplier 4 prefers its already accepted buyer
(1) to buyer 3.
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4. Buyer 3 now sends a request to the next supplier on its list, which is
supplier 1, who accepts that request and rejects buyer 2's request, which
it had previously accepted provisionally.
5. Buyer 2 has no more acceptable suppliers so no buyer sends another
request, which stops the algorithm.
Buyers 1, 3 and 4 are now matched with suppliers 4, 1 and 5, respectively.





than 1. For example, the reader may verify that buyers 1, 2, 3 and 4 will







The program consists of a main loop (see Table 1), a procedure called match-
Agents, and the declaration of several classes. The class agent contains the
following procedures:
setAlpha This is the procedure that chooses a value to be used for . A
random number between 0 and 1 is drawn like a roulette wheel being
spun. The wheel is divided like a pie in as many parts as there are
possible values for , with the size of each part proportional to the
relative strength of the associated value for .
updateWeights(alphaUsed,payoff) This procedure is called for updating
the strengths, associated with the dierent possible values for alpha.
The parameter alphaUsed is the value that was used for  and of which
the strength needs to be updated. This is done by adding the value of
payoff to the strength. Then, each strength is multiplied with the ratio
C=(C + payoff), to ensure that they add up to C again.
From the class agent, the classes buyerAgent and supplierAgent are de-
rived. These subclasses inherit all data and methods from the class agent. In
addition, data and methods are declared specically for the two subclasses.
The subclass buyerAgent contains the following procedures:
33
calculateSupplierScores This procedure calculate scores of suppliers and
self as Cobb-Douglas functions of protability and trust, as described
above in Section 5.1. If the buyer's value for  is 0, then the supplier's
score is simply equal to the buyer's trust in the supplier. The buyer
calculates his own score using eciency = 0, trust is 1, and  = 1.
buyerProcess If not matched then make; in any case, sell. The suppliers'
equivalent process supplierProcess is executed before the buyers', so if
a buyer is matched to a supplier, that supplier will already have produced
for him.
increaseTrust(subject) This increases the buyer's trust in subject on the
basis of the number of previous times they have been matched.
decreaseTrust(subject) This decreases the buyer's trust in subject.
Besides the data and methods inherited from the class agent, the subclass
supplierAgent contains the following procedures:
calculateBuyerScores This procedure calculates the scores the supplier as-
signs to each buyer. As in the buyer's equivalent procedure, if a buyer's
protability as well as the supplier's  are 0, the supplier's trust is used
as the buyer's score.
determineScaleEfficiency The supplier adds the general purpose assets re-
quired for producing for all the buyers she is matched to and calculates
the scale-function value of this number. This is the supplier's scale e-
ciency.
climbLearningCurve(subject) On the basis of the number of times they
have been matched before, the supplier calculates her eciency in using
subject-specic assets.
increaseTrust(subject) This procedure increases the supplier's trust in
subject on the basis of the number of previous times they have been
matched.
decreaseTrust(subject) This procedure decreases the supplier's trust in
subject.
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produceFor(subject) Based on buyer subject's dierentiation and the sup-
plier's (general) scale- and subject-specic eciency, the supplier ac-
quires the required assets and produces for subject.
supplierProcess Looking at each buyer in turn, if the supplier is matched
to that buyer, it produces for that buyer (see previous procedure).
A.3 Parameters and variables
This appendix gives a complete overview of all the parameters and variables,
used in the simulation; see Table 4.
value value
param./var. range used
general number of buyers, B f1; 2; : : :g 12
number of suppliers, S f1; 2; : : :g 12
number of runs f1; 2; : : :g 25
number of timesteps f1; 2; : : :g 250
per dierentiation [0; 1] f0:25; 0:35; : : : ; 0:75g
buyer o
b
f1; 2; : : : ; Sg 1
number of values for  f2; 3; : : :g 5
C h0; : : :i 20
baseTrust h0; 1] 0.3
initTrust(subject) h0; 1] 0.75
trustFactor [0; 1] 0.5
per a
s
f1; : : : ; Bg 3
supplier scaleFactor [0; 1] 0.5
learnFactor [0; 1] 0.5
number of values for  f2; 3; : : :g 5
C h0; : : :i 20
baseTrust h0; 1] 0.3
initTrust(subject) h0; 1] 0.75
trustFactor [0; 1] 0.5
Table 4: Parameters and variables in the simulation.
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